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Russia’s Hidden Underbelly of Debt 
Maya Rostowska 
Despite the reigning consensus that the Russian economy is facing trouble ahead, some indicators 
suggest that the situation is not as dire as first appeared. Moreover, it may seem that the fiscal 
situation in the country—particularly its copious foreign currency reserves and substantial sovereign 
wealth funds—could still help extricate Russia from its economic difficulties. However, the very difficult 
budgetary situation in the regions and the staggering levels of debt of its companies suggest that 
economic problems could hit the country hard. Investors should remain vigilant of social and political 
tensions and the possible further deterioration of the business environment in Russia. 
 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that the Russian economy’s vital signs—including investment, 
consumer confidence and industrial production—are deteriorating. Not only that, they are likely to suffer 
even more from Western sanctions and a worsening business climate linked to a lack of reform. It may 
therefore surprise some that the country’s debt is under control and its reserves are still strong. Savings in 
its two sovereign wealth funds and its foreign currency reserves have got Russia out of economic hot water 
before. Today they seem substantial enough to do it again. But a closer look at the country’s regional 
budgets reveals the dark underbelly of Russia’s fiscal situation and suggests that path may not be available 
this time around. 
 
Russia’s Economy: More Smoke than Fire? 
Much has been said and written about the economic difficulties facing Russia. In July, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) published a report showing that sanctions had had a deep impact on the Russian 
economy, particularly affecting investment. The IMF predicts a growth rate of 0.2% for Russia in 2014.1 
Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has predicted recession for 2014, and current Minister of the 
Economy Alexei Ulyukayev has said growth will be around zero for the first quarter of the year.2 In March, 
the World Bank predicted growth of 1.1% in 2014 in its low-risk scenario (which assumes peaceful 
containment of the crisis in Ukraine and a lack of further sanctions) and 0.8% in its high-risk scenario 
                                                          
 
1 International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation: 2014 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 14/75, July 2014, 
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(which assumes an intensification of political tensions and heightened uncertainties regarding the possibility 
of further sanctions).3 
These forecasts seem well-founded. Even before the crisis in Ukraine heated up, the Russian economy was 
already in a state of slowdown, with growth at 1.3% in 2013, failing to reach the World Bank prognosis of 
3.6%.4 This is due to falling investment, industrial production and consumption (linked to falling wage 
growth and consumer confidence).5 All this has been exacerbated by Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The first 
quarter of the year saw capital flight in excess of $51 billion (compared to $60 billion in the whole of 
2013).6 Sanctions and falling energy prices are likely to further dampen growth as they affect exports and 
export income. Meanwhile, corporate debt is ballooning, and increasingly reliant on external sources. 
Russian companies’ foreign debt reached 30% of GDP ($628 billion) in the first half of 2013, approaching 
the pre-crisis peak of 35.4% and exceeding the international reserves of the CBR.7 Many of these 
companies are for all intents and purposes state-owned, and may struggle to find external financing if 
sanctions against Russia are extended or the political situation in the country deteriorates. 
Meanwhile, pressure on the budget is rising. Federal spending is likely to rise due to President Vladimir 
Putin’s 2012 electoral pledges, costs linked to the annexation of Crimea,8 and upcoming infrastructure 
projects, including those related to the 2018 World Cup, the planned gas pipeline to China, and the Kerch 
bridge to Crimea. Russia is also likely to incur more military expenditures: last year it overtook the U.S. in 
relative terms, spending a staggering 3.4% of GDP (i.e., $73.2 billion) on defence; now it has announced an 
increase of 18.5% on those figures in 2014, with a further 21.7% increase in 2015.9 The aging population 
also foretells of ballooning expenditures in years to come: pension spending is expected to rise to 14% of 
GDP in 2030 (from 9% in 2012).10 What is more, Russian government bond ratings have been cut to BBB-, 
on par with Azerbaijan,11 in a move that will make financing federal government expenditures more difficult 
and expensive.  
However, many of the indicators that seemed to suggest serious economic difficulties ahead for Russia have 
seen a recovery. Following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in March, Russian markets plummeted—
massive selloffs caused the RTS index to fall by 13.8% to its lowest level since the 2009 crisis, and the 
trading of several stocks was suspended after they fell by more than 20%. But the RTS has now recovered 
to its January 2014 levels. Meanwhile, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) was able to soon restore 
confidence in the rouble—which was undergoing speculative attacks—by spending $11.3 billion of its 
international reserves on 3 March to support the exchange rate (about 2.3% of its total reserves).12 Finally, 
although it has been increasing minimally in recent years, Russia’s government debt is still very small 
compared to that of other countries (Russian public debt came to 12.7% of GDP in 2013, compared to 
101.5% for the U.S., 90.6% for the United Kingdom, 78.4% for Germany, 50.7% for Poland, and 22.4% for 
China).13 
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Reserves to Cushion the Fall 
As well as recovery in these indicators, it would seem that the Russian coffers are substantial enough to 
cushion a fall. In the past, Russia has been able to mitigate difficult economic situations thanks to its large 
reserves, accumulated in foreign currencies and its sovereign wealth funds. 
As Russian export revenues increased with oil prices in the early 2000s, domestic investment did not follow 
suit, leaving the country with large amounts of foreign currency savings. In 2004, the Oil Stabilisation Fund 
(OSF), Russia’s first sovereign wealth fund, was created. As soaring world oil prices (from $33.7/bbl in 2004 
to $99.6/bbl in 2008)14 brought ever-higher revenues, in 2008 the OSF was split into two separate entities: 
the Reserve Fund (RF) and the National Welfare Fund (NWF). Both received portions of oil and gas 
revenues. The RF was designed to act as a stabiliser, conservatively investing energy profits and budget 
surpluses to cushion the economy in the event of a fall in oil prices. The NWF would pursue the OSF’s 
savings objectives by investing in higher-risk, higher-return assets and be used to fill funding gaps in the 
pension system. 
Prudent fiscal policy and use of funds from the RF staved off the impact of the international financial crisis 
on Russia until 2009. The government provided enterprises and the financial sector with conditional 
support, such as lowered tax burdens. Nevertheless, when the crisis finally hit, Russia’s GDP contracted by 
a substantial 7.9%. Government expenditures rose and income fell, causing the country’s first budget deficit 
in a decade. As money was transferred to cover the budget deficit, the RF was depleted, decimated by 
about $57.56 billion in 2009 and $34.19 billion in 2010 in outflows to finance the federal budget deficit 
(Figure 1).15 Meanwhile, the Russian Central Bank sold foreign currency reserves to achieve a gradual 
devaluation of the rouble to help exporters (Figure 2). This tapping of its reserves allowed Russia to 
cushion the effects of the global financial crisis on its economy. The federal budget deficit was stemmed 
(shrinking from -7.9% of GDP in 2010 to -3.9% in 2011, and a surplus of 0.8% in 2012).16 Growth returned 
relatively quickly (from -7.9% in 2009 to 4.5% in 2010).17 
It would seem that the current fiscal situation in Russia would allow for a re-run of the 2009-2010 strategy 
of cushioning the crisis with transfers from the sovereign wealth funds and international reserves. After all, 
at $175.6 billion, funds in the RF and NWF are already above the 2009 total of $168 billion, and edging 
towards pre-crisis levels (Figure 1).18 International reserves are at $467.2 billion, of which $423.8 billion is 
in foreign currency reserves (Figure 2).19 Moreover, although the federal budget is once again running a 
deficit after one year in the black (it ran a surplus of 0.8% of GDP in 2012), this is planned to be only -0.5% 
of GDP in 2014—hardly an insurmountable figure.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
14 “World Oils,” www.worldoils.com. 
15 Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, “Funds flow on the Federal Treasury’s account with the Bank of Russia in rubles in 
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Figure 1. Russia’s OSF, RF and NWF (2006–2014, in $ billions) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; 1 December each year, except 2014 (1 May). 
 
Figure 2. Russia’s international reserves (2006–2014, in $ millions)21 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
 
 
                                                          
 
21 Here, “international reserves” refer to foreign exchange reserves, SDRs, reserve position in the IMF, and gold. See: “International 
Reserves ...,” op. cit. 
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The Hidden Threat: Sub-Par Subnational Budgets 
Although federal finances seem to be ticking along nicely, the fiscal picture at the sub-regional level is 
nowhere near as rosy. Regional governments are responsible for spending in areas such as healthcare, 
education, social welfare, and housing. These expenditures are financed by revenues from a share of federal 
taxes, grants from the central government, and some regional taxation—although subnational governments 
have very restricted autonomy in terms of tax policy. While regional governments account for 28% of 
general government revenue, their share of overall expenditures is almost 37%.22  
The regions’ fiscal situation has been going downhill since the 2000–2001 reforms that significantly 
increased the share of the central government in the consolidated budget to their detriment (from 44% in 
1999 to 66.2% in 2007). This was exacerbated by a 2005 law that redirected the bulk of profitable tax 
revenue to the central budget away from the regions, including excise taxes23 (although the regions were 
accorded slightly higher shares of corporate income tax and some excise taxes following the financial 
crisis). Moreover, several subnational taxes were abolished outright, including those on housing and 
utilities.24 As a result, the dependence of subnational budgets on transfers and grants from Moscow has 
grown considerably. 
Moreover, federal subjects have access to far fewer debt reduction mechanisms than the central 
government. Most rely on high-interest short-term bank loans and a limited supply of bonds and budget 
credits, such as federal loans, to finance their debt.25 Although most regional governments managed to keep 
their debt in check until 2008, since the global economic crisis the majority have seen their debt more than 
double (Figure 3). Aggregate regional public debt has risen from $18.5 billion in 2008 to $58 billion in 
2014—and it is expected to rise to $103 billion by next year.26  
 
Figure 3. Russian regional debt, 2008–2014 (in $ billions) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; Standard & Poor’s (* denotes estimate). 
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In fact, of the 83 Russian regions, it is estimated that 63 will be facing bankruptcy by 2015.27 This is because 
the regions will bear much of the financial brunt of President Putin’s electoral promises, such as increasing 
regional and municipal wages (to the tune of some $56.6 billion over the next two years) and replacing all 
dilapidated housing by 2016 without any help from Moscow.28 
What is more, the situation could deteriorate further in the mid-term. The Kremlin is planning mass 
reindustrialisation of the regions in an attempt to diversify the economy and reduce its reliance on energy. 
The idea is to construct factories and plants across Russia, with a goal of creating 25 million industrial jobs 
by 2020, in sectors as diverse as processed food, meat, dairy, metals, the auto industry and mining. But this 
strategy is set to put further financial pressure on the regions. Although the details of how the plan will be 
funded have not yet been revealed, it will be done through regional, federal and foreign investment. Given 
the current geopolitical situation—which is scaring off foreign investors and creating new costs for the 
federal budget—the regional budgets are likely to feel the pinch even more once this plan is set in motion. 
Finally, the fiscal situation of Russia’s regions is also likely to be put under pressure by future oil prices. 
There are many signs that Russia is in for a rough ride, fiscally speaking. While executing the federal budget 
as planned is likely to require oil prices as high as $115/bbl,29 these averaged $110/bbl in 2013. The price of 
oil is as important for regional government budgets as much as it is for the federal budget. Sub-national 
governments have limits imposed on their deficits, debts and borrowing, which are set in accordance with 
the average oil price for the last five years. Meanwhile, world energy prices are expected to lag in the long 
term. In the case of oil, this could result from rising supplies of unconventional oil, efficiency gains, as well 
as substitution away from oil. In the case of gas, substitution and efficiency gains could be exacerbated by 
the potential arrival on world gas markets of U.S. gas in the wake of its shale gas revolution.30 
Conclusion 
The increasingly difficult fiscal situation of the regions reflects the overall deteriorating situation in the 
Russian Federation. Under President Putin’s tenure, elections for governors have been scrapped and 
governors and speakers of regional parliaments have been excluded from the Federation Council, the very 
body that is supposed to promote the interests of the regions in Moscow. Now, the constantly changing 
fiscal regulatory framework, set entirely by the federal centre, creates an unpredictable environment for 
subnational governments, and makes it difficult for them to forecast and plan revenues and expenditures.31 
Falling revenues have further forced many regions to cut investment programmes, including infrastructure 
projects, even in the more developed parts of the country, such as Irkutsk or Sverdlovsk. Others have had 
to make unpopular cuts in social spending, including reductions in benefits and school closures.32 Public 
dissatisfaction is spreading, and could likely spur a crackdown on civil society and regional governments.  
Combined, all these factors suggest a deteriorating political and business environment for foreign investors 
in Russia. Spending by the central government may be squeezed as it is redirected towards new 
expenditure commitments and Moscow is forced to increase transfers to struggling subnational budgets. As 
a result, the government’s ability to provide stimulus packages to boost the lagging economy will suffer. The 
corporate sector may struggle to finance its activity if further sanctions are imposed on Russia. With public 
dissatisfaction growing and the economy wilting, further tightening of the screws can be expected, on 
foreign business (in the form of administrative pressures or even expropriations and nationalisations) as 
much as on civil society, as has been the form in President Putin’s Russia in the past.  
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